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NET STABLE FUNDING RATIO AND PROFIT EFFICIENCY  
OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN THE U.S. 
 




The net stable funding ratio (NSFR) is introduced under Basel III to promote financial stability. 
Under this new regulation, individual financial institutions are required to maintain a sustainable 
funding structure; hence this new universal requirement is expected to affect bank operation. In 
this paper, we provide one of the first empirical examinations of the non-linear relationship 
between NSFR and profit (in)efficiency for commercial banks using two data sets from Bankscope 
(for years from 2000 to 2015) and Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council call reports 
(2000-2013 period). Our results suggest that modest intensification in liquidity helps to reduce 
bank profit inefficiency (i.e. increase efficiency) but too much liquidity enlargement could increase 
the inefficiency. This result is consistent with a trade-off hypothesis on the non-linear relationship 
between liquidity and bank performance.  














Liquidity shortage is identified as one of the primary factors that have caused systemic instability 
in the financial systems before and during the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2007/08 (Acharya 
and Mora, 2015; Khan et al., 2016). To avoid liquidity shortfall, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2010) proposed two liquidity principles under Basel III regulatory framework, 
namely Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) and Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). The NSFR aims 
at addressing long-term liquidity mismatch over a one-year horizon and the LCR targets at 
maintaining sufficient liquid assets to avoid the mismatch over a short-term (thirty days) horizon. 
Literature has shown that many banks need to change their management strategies (DeYoung and 
Jang, 2016; King, 2013; Schmaltz et al., 2014) and thus may have an adverse effect on their 
performance.  
In general, there are two possible sets of actions that banks may take in response to the new 
regulations: better capitalization and balance sheet restructuring (Härle et al., 2010). First, to be 
safer in terms of liquidity, banks can increase their equity capital ratio because equity can play as 
a cushion for both capital and liquidity shortage. Moreover, banks with better capitalization can 
borrow long-term debts more easily and at lower costs (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Second, 
banks might restructure their balance sheets, particularly assets and funding items because these 
items are used to compute the NSFR and LCR. For instance, to achieve higher NSFR and LCR, 
banks can hold more long-term funding (i.e. equity and deposits), which might incur more 
expenses than holding short-term funding. Banks might allocate more funding into liquid assets 
such as cash and securities on the asset side. These combined actions, however, limit maturity 
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transformation (Dietrich et al., 2014), business model (Härle et al., 2010), and therefore influence 
bank performance. 
Specifically, King (2013) highlights the well-known trade-offs between new liquidity 
requirements and profitability: the liquidity regulations should increase the resilience of banks 
during stressful periods but at the cost of a reduction in banks’ profitability during normal times. 
In fact, concerns raised by banks that the liquidity requirements dramatically and adversely impact 
banks operation and profitability have led to the delayed implementation of the new liquidity 
requirements. However, only a few empirical studies examine the impacts of new liquidity 
requirements on bank performance since the announcement of BASEL III.  
In the broader empirical literature on the effect of regulation on bank performance, studies either 
focus on accounting measures or use frontier analysis methods (Jakovljević et al., 2015). Dietrich 
et al. (2014) appear to be the first empirical examination on the impact of NSFR on bank 
profitability using the accounting measures. In the study, historical data of 921 Western European 
banks between 1996 and 2010 was used and empirical results showed that NSFR did not have a 
significant impact on banks’ returns on assets and equity or net interest margin. Recently, Cai et 
al. (2019) show that with an increase in the NSFR in the U.S. banks would expect to experience a 
fall in their market power. However, to our best knowledge, there are neither empirical studies 
which investigate the relationship between NSFR and profit efficiency of banks in the United State 
of America (USA) nor empirical studies that use the frontier analysis method. 
One advantage of using the frontier analysis method in analysing bank performance is its ability 
to benchmark the efficiency performance of each bank at each point of time with respect to the 
production frontier that underpins the production technology in the entire banking industry (Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997; Thanassoulis et al., 1996). Hence, using the frontier approach, our paper 
will be the first empirical study that investigates the non-linear relationship between bank profit 
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efficiency and liquidity risk in terms of NSFR. We argue that this empirical relationship is 
important as NSFR captures liquidity risk, which reflects a different risk dimension from other 
types of risks such as credit risk (Berger and De Young, 1997), default likelihood (Fiordelisi et al., 
2011), value-at-risk (Chang and Chiu, 2006), and systemic risk (Beccalli et al., 2015). 
The non-linear relationship between bank efficiency and liquidity risk originates from the 
argument on a possible optimal level of capital or liquidity that bank managers set to achieve a 
certain level of profits (Delis, Hasan, and Tsionas, 2014). These authors assume that more efficient 
banks are more closely followed by both big creditors and depositors. Therefore, these banks hold 
less liquidity because they are easier to raise enough funds from interbank markets (wholesale 
liabilities) and loan sale markets. Whereas, less efficient banks may need to hold more liquidity 
because they are more difficult to raise enough funds to meet unexpected demands. The optimal 
level of liquidity shapes our idea that liquidity risk should be considered as a non-linear variable 
in explain efficiency level. The idea of the optimal level of liquidity is supported by previous 
studies of Buser, Chen, and Kane (1981) and Flannery (1994) which discuss the optimal capital 
structure of commercial banks. 
Moreover, we expect the non-linear relationship between bank efficiency and liquidity risk 
because a bank implementing the NSFR may find a more liquidity-efficient business model when 
its maturity transformation is limited. Increasing liquidity might increase a bank’s funding cost but 
does not necessarily lead to a reduction in accounting profit ratios such as return on assets, return 
on equity and interest margin (Dietrich, Hess, and Wanzenried, 2014), implicitly indicating a 
possibly equivalent or even greater increase in interest and non-interest income. Therefore, the 
marginal impact of liquidity risk on efficiency may change according to a bank’s liquidity risk. In 
this sense, focusing on the linear relationship may have a biased result on the trade-off.  
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We use the frontier approach to examine a relationship between profit inefficiency and NSFR for 
commercial banks in the U.S. using two data sets from Bankscope (3,765 unique banks with 45,198 
yearly observations) and Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council call reports (8,357 
unique banks with 92,961 yearly observations). Empirical results from the stochastic frontier 
analysis favour an inverse U-shaped relationship between liquidity and bank inefficiency: greater 
liquidity is associated with lower inefficiency but too much liquidity might be associated with an 
increase in bank inefficiency.  
The paper is structured as follow. Section 2 provides brief related literature. Sections 3 and 4 
describe the methodology and data used. Section 4 presents the key findings. Section 6 provides a 
conclusion. 
2. Related literature 
A core function of commercial banks is to finance illiquid loans from customer deposits. Banking 
theories argue differing roles of the banks on the process of liquidity creation. Contemporary 
financial intermediation theories assume that banks are passive on the asset side because they 
simply allocate their granted loans (for a given fixed tenor) (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; 
Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984). Normally, these loans are more illiquid than their customer 
deposits. A recent theory of banking namely “warehouse banking” of Donaldson, Piacentino, and 
Thakor (2018) argues that banks are more active on both sides of the balance sheet because they 
own warehouse technologies to manage client deposits as well as to enforce borrowers to repay 
their loans. By increasing more loans into the economy from the same amount of client deposits, 
banks are more efficient in the sense of earning more interest income and paying less cost of capital 
at the same time with a greater chance of liquidity shortage. This suggests a potential trade-off 
relationship between liquidity risk and efficiency.  
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Our study is also closely related primarily to the literature on the empirical relationship between 
credit risk and bank efficiency; hence we limit our literature review on this area of research with 
the focus on those studies on U.S.A. banks. A comprehensive study of Berger and De Young 
(1997) highlights four underlying mechanisms explaining the different mechanism that captures 
the relationship between credit risk and bank efficiency. First, decreases in efficiency tend to 
follow increases in risk, which supports the bad luck hypothesis. This hypothesis refers to the 
situation where an increase in credit risk results from an outside shock, beyond the bank’s control. 
Efficiency falls because banks spend an increasing level of resources to deal with credit risk. 
Second, increases in risk follow falls in cost efficiency, which suggests the bad management 
hypothesis. The bad management hypothesis implies that bad management leads to excessive 
operating costs as well as poor risk monitoring practices, which results in lower efficiency and 
higher risk. Moreover, increases in risk are associated with higher costs of monitoring and selling 
off risk and thus this leads to a further decrease in cost efficiency. Third, increases in efficiency 
may lead to increases in risk and this favours the skimping hypothesis1. The skimping hypothesis 
implies a trade-off between short-run efficiency (via cost reduction or profit maximization) and 
long-run deterioration in asset quality. Finally, increases in leverage ratios for thinly capitalized 
banks tend to precede increases in non-performing loans (NPLs). This strengthens the moral 
hazard hypothesis that, in certain circumstances, bank managers alter their behaviour toward 
excessive risk-taking. Consequently, such moral hazard activity results in higher credit risk in the 
future. Among the four hypotheses, the trade-off between risk and efficiency is closer to the 
skimping view.  
 
1 In the short-term, one can argue that bank efficiency is positively correlated with credit risk as a bank chooses not to 
spend sufficient resources on analysing loan applications. If this lending practice remains, this could lead to higher 
levels of non-performing loans and the associated expenses to solve the problem loans in the long run. 
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The empirical literature has employed different measures of risks which are based on-balance-
sheet and market data for examining the relationship between bank efficiency and risk. In terms of 
the balance-sheet risk, the most common type is credit risk proxied by NPLs. Berger and De Young 
(1997) use the SFA approach to measure cost efficiency in the first stage. Then they use non-
performing loans (NPL) in the second stage to test for the relation. The advantage of using NPL 
lies at its less managerial discretion than loan loss provision and charge-offs, all of which stand 
for credit risk. Employing Granger causality techniques and a U.S commercial bank data sample 
for the period 1985–1994, they provide evidence for a negative interaction between risk and 
efficiency.  
Berger and Mester (1997) assess the sources of efficiency of 6,000 US banks covering the period 
1990-1995 using differing efficiency concepts, measurement methods, and bank, market, and 
regulatory characteristics. They argue that the quality of outputs has significant impacts on 
estimates of the efficiency level. In particular, differences in loan features, ranging from size, 
payment schedule, risk, collateral, covenants, etc., lead to differences in the cost of lending, 
monitoring and risk control. Most notably, Berger and Mester (1997) recognize that off-balance 
sheet items bear the same credit risk as loans. Their empirical results show that bad management 
practices could lead to high costs and low profits and high level of NPLs.  
Outside the USA, recent literature argues that market-based measures (such as distance-to-default, 
expected default frequency, and systemic risk) could capture better the risk level of banks due to 
their forward-looking information and real-time basis (Beccalli et al., 2015; Chang and Chiu, 2006; 
Fiordelisi et al., 2011). Employing the two-stage DEA model, Chang and Chiu (2006) assess bank 
efficiency in Taiwan in which value-at-risk (VaR) and credit risk measured by NPL are viewed as 
undesired output in a cost efficiency model. Their finding hints that the risk factors matter and 
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bank performance is lower when NPL and VaR increase. More recently Beccalli et al. (2015) 
examined how risk impacts scale economies (i.e. average cost reduction by increasing output level) 
for 103 listed banks in Europe over the period 2000-2011. Using different types of risks (i.e. 
liquidity ratio, loans loss provision ratio, Tier 1 capital ratio, off-balance-sheet risks, and systemic 
risk), the authors find that scale economies exist across quantiles of bank size and an increase in 
the first lag of systemic risk causes a fall in economies of scale.  
Majority of the literature has focused on the relationship between risk and efficiency in the banking 
sector mainly employing credit risk, value at risk, and market risk. Little is known about how 
liquidity (risk), which played a key role in the safety of one and multiple banks during the GFC 
2007-8, influences efficiency. Due to its importance, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010) introduced the Net Stable Funding Ratio 
(NSFR) to strengthen bank liquidity risk management practices. This paper fills the gap by 
investigating the relationship between this new liquidity standard and bank profit inefficiency. One 
of our focus is to empirically examine the possible trade-off between liquidity level and profit 
efficiency. In fact, our model allows for a non-linear relationship and examines the optimal level 
of liquidity in terms of its impact on bank efficiency.  
3. Methodology 
3.1. Profit efficiency estimation 
Following recent empirical literature (Gaganis and Pasiouras, 2013; Luo, Tanna, and De Vita, 
2016), we employ the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) approach in measuring efficiency and 
investigating the impact of liquidity on profit efficiency. The efficiency is constructed based on 
the concept of operational optimization in which bank profit can be considered as the output of the 
banks’ operation. To allow for possible impacts of liquidity on the operation of banks, which 
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results in the efficiency performance as well as the variation of efficiency across banks, we 
measure technical efficiency using a stochastic frontier model of Battese and Coelli (1995). This 
empirical model also allows us to control bank-specific characteristics in a single step of estimating 
efficiency and examining the determinants of variation of efficiency among banks. The model is 
specified as: 
 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜋(𝑝𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑤𝑖,𝑡; 𝛽) + (𝑣𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡), (1) 
where t denotes time dimension;  𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐵𝑇𝑖 is the logarithm of the profit before tax of bank i; 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 is 
a vector of output prices; 𝑤𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of input prices; 𝛽 denotes a vector of unknown parameters 
to be estimated. 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is a random variable, which is assumed to be i.i.d. distributed as a 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣2). 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is a non-negative random variable, which is assumed to account for the operational 
inefficiency. 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is estimated by truncation at zero of the 𝑁(𝑚𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜎𝑢2) distribution and 𝑚𝑖,𝑡 is 
defined as:  
 𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖,𝑡−1𝛿, (2) 
where 𝑧𝑖,𝑡−1 is a (1 × 𝑀) vector of explanatory variables (i.e. bank liquidity and characteristics) 
that influence the periodic inefficiency of each bank and explain variations in the inefficiency level 
among banks; 𝛿 is a (𝑀 × 1) vector of estimated coefficients. We follow Battese and Coelli (1995) 
in estimating 𝛽  and 𝛿 in one step using maximum likelihood estimator. 
We select bank inputs and output following the intermediation approach that views banks as agents 
that collect funds as inputs and allocate them into earning assets. As normally done in the empirical 
literature, banks are assumed to undertake lending and non-lending activities which are specified 
as two outputs. The prices for these outputs are defined as (i) the ratio of net interest income to net 
loans (𝑃1) and (ii) the ratio of non-interest income to other earning assets (𝑃2). We include three 
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inputs: borrowing fund, labour and physical capital. The prices for the inputs are defined as the 
cost of borrowed fund (𝑊1), cost of labour (𝑊2), cost of physical capital (𝑊3). 𝑊1 is calculated as 
the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits. 𝑊2 is computed as the ratio of personnel expenses 
to total assets. 𝑊3 is computed as the ratio of overhead expenses net of personnel expenses to fixed 
assets.  
Following Gaganis and Pasiouras (2013), we include equity (𝐸𝑄) as a proxy for bank risk profile 
in equation 1. We include EQ because ignoring 𝐸𝑄 can lead to a scale bias originating from its 
twin roles: a cushion for risk and a funding source of bank outputs such as loans and investment   
(Berger and Mester, 1997). Furthermore, we include a dummy size variable (Dummysize) to 
capture the effect of bank size.  
As normally done in the empirical literature, we normalize the dependent variable and all output 
and input prices by the cost of physical capital (𝑊3) and employ the Translog functional form. The 
estimated model is as follows: 
ln(𝑃𝐵𝑇 𝑊3⁄ ) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln ( 𝑃1𝑊3) + 𝛽2 ln ( 𝑃2𝑊3) + 𝛽3 ln (𝑊1𝑊3) + 𝛽4 ln (𝑊2𝑊3) 
 +𝛽5 12 (ln ( 𝑃1𝑊3))2 + 𝛽6 ln ( 𝑃1𝑊3) ln ( 𝑃2𝑊3) + 𝛽7 12 (ln ( 𝑃2𝑊3))2 + 𝛽8 12 (ln (𝑊1𝑊3))2 
 +𝛽9 ln ( 𝑃1𝑊3) ln (𝑊1𝑊3) + 𝛽10 ln ( 𝑃2𝑊3) ln (𝑊1𝑊3) + 𝛽11 12 (ln (𝑊2𝑊3))2 + 𝛽12 ln ( 𝑃1𝑊3) ln (𝑊2𝑊3) 
 +𝛽13 ln ( 𝑃2𝑊3) ln (𝑊2𝑊3) + 𝛽14 ln (𝑊1𝑊3) ln (𝑊2𝑊3) + 𝛽15 ln(𝐸𝑄) + 𝛽16 12 (ln(𝐸𝑄))2 
 +𝛽17 ln(𝐸𝑄) ln ( 𝑃1𝑊3) + 𝛽18 ln(𝐸𝑄) ln ( 𝑃2𝑊3) + 𝛽19 ln(𝐸𝑄) ln (𝑊1𝑊3) 










+𝛽25𝑇 ln (𝑊2𝑊3) + 𝛽26𝑇 ln(𝐸𝑄) + 𝛽27𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
 
To examine the direct impact of liquidity on (in)efficiency, we specify 𝑚𝑖,𝑡 in equation 2 as: 𝑚𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1,  𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1), (4) 
where 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is the lagged value of bank liquidity. We employ the Basel III Accord’s Net 
Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) and core deposits-to-loans (DTL) ratio. Guided by empirical 
literature in banking sector, this paper uses four bank characteristic variables: the lagged value of 
asset diversification (𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑉), the lagged value of funding diversification (𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑉), the lagged value 
of logarithm value of total assets (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) and the lagged value of non-performing loan ratio (𝑁𝑃𝐿). 
We follow the approach of Curi et al. (2015) and Elsas et al. (2010) to compute 𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑉 and 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑉. 
Specifically, in the computation of 𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑉, the loans and advances to banks (𝐼𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁), customer 
loans (𝐶𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁), and financial securities (𝐹𝑆𝐸𝐶) and other investments in property (𝐼𝑃) are used 
according to the following equation:      
 𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑉 = 1 − ((𝐼𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐸𝐴 )2 + (𝐶𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝐸𝐴 )2 + (𝐹𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐸𝐴 )2 + ( 𝐼𝑃𝐸𝐴)2), (5) 
where earning assets (𝐸𝐴) is the sum of the four numerators. 
In the calculation of funding diversification (𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑉), equity (𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼), customer deposits (𝐶𝐷𝐸𝑃), 
deposits from banks (𝐼𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑃), and other interest-bearing liabilities (𝑂𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇) are used as below: 
 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑉 = 1 − (( 𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷)2 + (𝐶𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷)2 + (𝐼𝐵𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷 )2 + (𝑂𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷 )2), (6) 




3.2. Liquidity measurement 
The paper employs two liquidity indicators as dependent variables. We use the net stable funding 
ratio (NSFR) and the core deposits-to-loans (DTL) ratio to proxy for bank liquidity. A high value 
of NSFR and DTL corresponds to a high level of liquidity. The NSFR is measured as: 
 𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅 = 𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝐴𝑆𝐹)𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑅𝑆𝐹) =  ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝐿𝑖𝑖∑ 𝑤𝑗𝐴𝑗𝑗 , (7) 
where the weights 𝑤𝑖 and 𝑤𝑗  are bounded between zero and one. The value of these weights reflects 
the stability of items in the bank balance sheet. The available stable funding (ASF) is the 
summation of bank liabilities and their corresponding weights. On the liability side, more stable 
funding sources are assigned greater weights. The required stable funding (RSF) is defined as the 
summation of bank assets and their corresponding weights. On the asset side, more liquid assets 
are assigned lower weights. A bank has low liquidity risk when its NSFR is high.  
The BASEL III Accord calls the weights are ASF and RSF factors. These factors are specific 
weights applied to funding sources and assets. The weights corresponding to funding sources are 
called ASF factors, which represent the stability of the funding sources: more stable funds are 
assigned higher ASF factor. The weights corresponding to assets are called RSF factors. Unlike 
the ASF factor, a higher RSF factor represents less liquidity of an asset. 
Table 1: Weights used to compute NSFR 
TOTAL ASSETs Weight 
(%) 
 TOTAL LIABILITIES and EQUITIES Weight 
(%) 
I. Earning assets   I.  Deposits & short-term funding  
   Loans 100      Customer deposits  
   Other earning assets 35        + Current deposits  85 
         + Saving deposits  70 
         + Term deposits 70 
       Bank Deposits  0 
     
II. Fixed assets 100  II. Other interest-bearing funding  
       Derivatives 0 
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       Trading liabilities 0 
       Long term liabilities 100 
        + Total long-term liabilities 100 
        + Preferred shares  100 
     
III. Non-earning assets   III.  Noninterest-bearing funding 100 
     Cash and due from banks 0  IV.  Reserves (for loan loss) 100 
     Goodwill and other intangibles 100  V.   Other reserves 100 
     Other assets 100  VI.  Owners’ equity 100 
Source: Vazquez and Federico (2015). 
Due to unavailability of the information of bank assets and liabilities to compute the NSFR,  we 
follow Vazquez and Federico (2015) in building up a “stylized bank balance sheet” and weights 
to approximate the NSFR ratio as shown in Table 1. Bankscope data set does not allow to split the 
loan portfolios into different types by residual maturity, which entail weight ranging from 50% to 
100%. With a conservative view, we assign the maximum weight of 100% to the total loan 
portfolio and an average of 35% for other earning assets as BASEL III requests a range from 20% 
to 50% for other earning assets. For fixed assets and non-earning assets, we allocate the weight of 
100%. On the liability side, we apply the BASEL III’s ASF factors for each liability category.  
For the data set from the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council call reports), we follow the computation of NSFR as shown in 
the Appendix A (for period 2000-2011) and Appendix B (for period 2012-2013) in DeYoung and 
Jang (2016). Appendix A summarizes the components of ASF and RSF, the weights associated 
with each of these components, and the appropriate item numbers in the 1991 Statements of 
Condition and Income (call reports). As data structure of the call reports from 2014-now has 
changed significantly from that from before 2013 so we only compute the NSFR for the period 




In addition to the NSFR as our key liquidity indicator, we employ the core deposits-to-loans (DTL) 
ratio as another liquidity variable. The ratio presents a relative proportion between core deposits 
and gross loans. Thus, banks with a higher DTL ratio is more liquid than those with a lower ratio. 
We use the DTL rather than the LCR because the computation the LCR requiring certain 
unreported information such as high-quality liquid assets and projected net cash outflow for the 
next 30 days (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010) is not feasible (Dietrich et al., 
2014). The use of DTL is also supported by the research of Acharya and Mora (2015) because 
DTL displays a liquidity shortfall of individual banks. 
4. Data description 
We obtain accounting information of commercial banks (CBs) in the U.S. from 2000 to 2015 from 
Bankscope and from 2000 to 2013 from Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council call 
reports (CALL reports). Variables used are defined in Table 2. We excluded all observations with 
missing and zero values. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we follow Acharya and Mora (2015b) 
in winsorizing all variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. As the lagged values of NSFR and DTL 
are used as explanatory variables, we only keep CBs which have at least four continuous annual 
observations. Our final samples have 45,198 bank-year observations of 3,765 unique banks for 
Bankscope dataset and 92,961 observations of 8,357 unique banks for CALL report dataset. 
Table 2: Definition of variables 
Panel A: Variables in the frontier function 
PBT Profit before tax 𝑃1 Price of loans, computed as the ratio of net interest income to net loans. 𝑃2 Price of other earning assets, calculated as the ratio of non-interest income to other 
earning assets. 𝑊1 Cost of funds, calculated as the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits. 𝑊2 Cost of labour, computed as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets 𝑊3 Cost of physical assets, calculated as the ratio of overhead expenses net of 
personnel expenses to fixed assets 
EQ Equity capital ratio 
Dummysize A dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if a bank’s total assets exceed 50 percentile 
of the sample’s total assets in the same year and equal to 0 otherwise 
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Pane B: Variables in the inefficiency term-base model 
NSFR* The ratio of the available stable funding (ASF) over the required stable funding 
(RSF). The computation of ASF and RSF relies on the weights shown in Table 1 
DTL The ratio of core deposits to loans 
ADIV* Asset diversification. The computation of this variable is shown in Eq. (5) 
FDIV* Asset diversification. The computation of this variable is shown in Eq. (6) 
SIZE The logarithm of total assets 
NPL Period non-performing loans over total loans 
Crisis A dummy variable: Financial crisis years are the years 2007 and 2008 
*: authors’ calculation using data from Bankscope and Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council call reports 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables employed in this paper. The average 
NSFR ratio is 0.97 with a large degree of dispersion across banks, ranging from 0.71 to 2.16 for 
Bankscope data set. About 75 percentage of bank-years observations has NSFR ratio less than one 
in this data set. Among other variables, on average, a bank has DTL of 1.32, asset diversification 
of 0.73, fund diversification of 0.25, log asset value of 5.69, and NPL of 1.97 percent. For the call 
reports, however, the average NSFR ratio is 1.53 with a wide variation across banks, ranging from 
0.56 to 7.14. On average, a bank has DTL of 1.17, asset diversification of 0.34, fund diversification 
of 0.18, log asset value of 11.87, and NPL of 1.23 percent. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 N Min P25 Mean P50 P75 Max STD 
PANEL A: BANKSCOPE  
Variables in the frontier ln(𝑃𝐵𝑇 𝑊3⁄ ) 45198 -6.30 -0.24 0.03 0.04 0.36 4.06 0.66 ln(𝑃1 𝑊3⁄ ) 45198 -1.51 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.11 0.18 ln(𝑃2 𝑊3⁄ ) 45198 -0.74 -0.09 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.71 0.18 ln(𝑊1 𝑊3⁄ ) 45198 -2.87 -0.49 -0.10 -0.05 0.36 2.51 0.63 ln(𝑊2 𝑊3⁄ ) 45198 -1.44 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.80 0.13 ln(𝐸𝑄) 45198 -3.56 -0.08 0.08 0.06 0.24 2.79 0.35 
Dummysize 45198 0.00 0.00 0.61 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 
Variables in the inefficiency term-base model 
NSFR 45198 0.71 0.87 0.97 0.94 1.04 1.99 0.14 
DTL 45198 0.77 1.08 1.32 1.23 1.45 3.30 0.35 
ADIV 45198 0.03 0.73 0.73 0.77 0.79 0.82 0.11 
FDIC 45198 0.05 0.19 0.25 0.23 0.29 0.52 0.08 
Size 45198 2.89 4.75 5.69 5.46 6.41 10.60 1.30 
NPL (%) 45198 0.01 0.40 1.97 0.94 2.30 14.60 2.72 
Crisis 45198 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.35 
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PANEL B: CALL REPORTS  
Variables in the frontier ln(𝑃𝐵𝑇 𝑊3⁄ ) 92961 -11.94 -0.18 0.00 0.00 0.18 6.13 0.51 ln(𝑃1 𝑊3⁄ ) 92961 -6.98 -0.18 0.00 -0.01 0.17 5.24 0.40 ln(𝑃2 𝑊3⁄ ) 92961 -1.32 -0.19 0.00 -0.01 0.18 1.48 0.35 ln(𝑊1 𝑊3⁄ ) 92961 -9.45 -0.52 -0.05 0.03 0.48 6.29 0.80 ln(𝑊2 𝑊3⁄ ) 92961 -2.57 -2.23 -0.01 -0.01 0.19 2.75 0.38 ln(𝐸𝑄) 92961 -4.57 -0.10 0.03 0.02 0.16 2.99 0.32 
Dummysize 92961 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 
Variables in the inefficiency term-base model 
NSFR 92961 0.56 1.17 1.53 1.36 1.68 7.14 0.62 
DTL 92961 0.48 0.90 1.17 1.07 1.33 3.49 0.42 
ADIV 92961 0.00 0.25 0.34 0.38 0.46 0.55 0.18 
FDIC 92961 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.16 0.53 0.20 
Size 92961 9.16 11.05 11.87 11.74 12.53 16.60 1.23 
NPL (%) 92961 0.01 0.02 1.23 0.03 1.50 19.37 2.27 
Crisis 92961 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.35 
Source: Bankscope, Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council call reports and authors’ calculation. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Profit efficiency score 
Table 4 summarizes the mean and standard deviation of profit efficiency scores, which show mean 
scores being higher for CALL report dataset than for Bankscope. Using Bankscope dataset, the 
mean efficiency score for the entire period is 0.76, implying that on average a bank could increase 
its profit by 24 percent. Another feature is that the profit efficiency has a cyclical pattern over time, 
increasing from 0.79 to 0.83 during the period 2001-2005 before decreasing from 0.82 to 0.61 over 
the period 2006-2009, and then increasing from 0.70 to 0.80 during 2010-2015. The score 
variability is higher during the global financial crisis (GFC) period. This cyclical trend is also 
observed in previous empirical studies (Gaganis and Pasiouras, 2013; Luo et al., 2016). 
Table 4: Efficiency scores. 
 Bankscope Call Reports 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
2000 0.767 0.123 0.927 0.035 
2001 0.769 0.117 0.930 0.031 
2002 0.789 0.105 0.933 0.018 
2003 0.790 0.108 0.934 0.017 
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2004 0.801 0.103 0.935 0.021 
2005 0.818 0.100 0.934 0.026 
2006 0.813 0.110 0.931 0.350 
2007 0.784 0.149 0.929 0.032 
2008 0.687 0.218 0.920 0.076 
2009 0.663 0.227 0.911 0.114 
2010 0.707 0.203 0.929 0.033 
2011 0.727 0.181 0.933 0.020 
2012 0.763 0.160 0.933 0.023 
2013 0.781 0.140 0.933 0.018 
2014 0.793 0.132   
2015 0.804 0.118   
 
5.2. Baseline analysis 
The main focus of the present paper is to examine the relationship between liquidity in term of 
NSFR on profit efficiency. In the baseline analysis, we employ the NSFR to proxy for liquidity. 
Results in Table 5 display estimates of two specifications: one with lagged NSFR (𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅𝑡−1) and 
another with both the lagged NSFR and its squared value  (𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅𝑡−12 ). The overall finding is that 
there is a negative impact of NSFR on bank profit inefficiency. In addition, there exists a U-shaped 
impact of liquidity on the bank efficiency and that the impact is consistent across two data sets 
from Bankscope and call reports.  
Table 5: Impact of the NSFR on bank profit inefficiency scores. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 Dependent variable: 𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝑰𝑻 𝑰𝑵𝑬𝑭𝑭𝑰𝑪𝑰𝑬𝑵𝑪𝒀𝒕  
 PANEL A: Bankscope PANEL B: Call Reports 
         𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅𝑡−1 -4.584 *** -34.588 *** -2.454 *** -23.281 *** 
 (1.074)  (4.927)  (0.161)  (2.827)  𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅𝑡−12    14.211 ***   8.961 *** 
   (2.078)    (0.360)  𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 10.878 *** 12.100 *** -20.929 *** -17.129 *** 
 (2.719)  (2.608)  (0.743)  (3.145)  𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 6.639 *** 6.293 *** -12.461 *** -49.222 *** 
 (1.323)  (1.235)  (0.231)  (1.100)  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 3.231 *** 2.967 *** 8.802 *** 43.911 *** 
 (0.340)  (0.302)  (0.143)  (0.949)  𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡−1 1.016 *** 0.950 *** 85.448 *** 266.671 *** 
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 (0.108)  (0.098)  (2.328)  (8.703)  
Crisis 5.626 *** 5.156 *** 0.791 *** 6.030 *** 
 (0.637)  (0.570)  (0.330)  (1.665)  
Constant -42.074 *** -24.606 *** -135.493 *** -652.373 *** 
 (5.246)  (4.178)  (2.237)  (14.749)  
Banks 3765  3765  8357  8357  
Yearly obs. 30069  30069  88401  88401  
This table presents the impacts of NSFR and other bank control variables on profit inefficiency. Regressions 
1 and 2 use data from Bankscope and regressions 3 and 4 from Call Reports (or Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council call reports). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels.    
Results from regression 1 and 3 in Table 5 clearly show that the lagged NSFR is statistically 
negatively related to profit inefficiency, suggesting a positive relationship between NSFR and 
profit efficiency (or negative relationship between NSFR and inefficiency). The negative impact 
can occur because banks with more liquidity are resistant to the liquidity shortage and outperform 
those with less liquidity. On the asset side, we may assume that banks with higher NSFR are more 
revenue-effective in allocating credits and investments because they have more available capital 
to grant credits to big clients and invest in more profitable projects. On the funding side, we could 
suppose that banks with higher NSFR are more cost-effective in mobilizing external fundings in a 
short time. Therefore, we may conclude that banks with a higher NSFR are more efficient in their 
financial intermediation process because they are more optimal in both capital mobilization and 
allocation compared to banks with a lower NSFR. Our result is in line with the empirical research 
of Tsionas et al. (2015) which defines bank liquidity as total cash to total deposits and obtains a 
negative influence of the liquidity on the cost efficiency of European banks. However, our result 
considerably differs from the study of Dietrich et al. (2014) which provides evidence of no effect 
of NSFR on accounting profitability (including return on assets, return on equity and net interest 
margin).  
Regressions 2 and 4 consist of the one-period lagged NSFR and its squared value to see if there 
exists a nonlinear influence on bank profit inefficiency. Our results confirm that the squared value 
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of the one-period lagged NSFR has a statistically significant impact on profit inefficient. In other 
words, too much liquidity may have a side effect on bank performance. Our results suggest that 
there could be a threshold effect where a too large increase in NSFR can result in higher profit 
inefficiency as captured by a positive quadratic term of NSFR in regressions 2 and 4. From this 
perspective, an interesting question for bank managers is that what the optimal NSFR should be? 
Using the results in table 5, we calculated the turning point occurs when NSFR is 2.432 for 
Bankscope data set and 2.603 for CALL report data set. Previous studies also suggest an optimal 
quantity of liquid asset holdings for a bank which equates the marginal opportunity cost of liquid 
asset holdings to their marginal return (De Haan and van den End, 2013). Diamond (1991) 
proposes an optimal financial mechanism showing that maturity of both financial assets and real 
investments increases when market participation increases.  
The statistical significance of the one-period lagged NSFR and its quadratic term suggests that the 
relationship between liquidity and inefficiency should be nonlinear. This finding is substantially 
different from previous studies which focus only on the linear effect of liquidity on bank 
performance. For example, Berger and Bouwman (2009) find a linearly positive effect of liquidity 
creation on profitability (in terms of the net surplus between the banks, borrowers and depositors). 
Or liquidity creation imposed a linearly negative effect on bank performance (Goddard et al., 2013; 
Molyneux and Thornton, 1992). More recently, Tsionas et al. (2015) examined a linear effect of 
liquidity4 on technical and allocative inefficiency and found a linearly negative association.  
 
2 We get the result by using: 
𝛿𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝛿𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅 = −34.588 + 14.211 × 𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅 = 0. From this equation, we find NSFR is 
2.43. 
3 We get the result by using: 
𝛿𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝛿𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅 = −23.281 + 8.961 × 𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅 = 0. From this equation, we find NSFR is 
2.60 
4 The authors defined liquidity as a ratio of total cash to total deposits. 
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There are two possible explanations for the U-shaped impact of NSFR on bank profit inefficiency. 
On the one hand, two much stable funding incurs higher costs. A crucial factor to meet the NSFR 
target for banks is to enlarge their base of stable funding, mainly from long-term liabilities and 
core deposits. However, these funding sources are more expensive than short-term ones. On the 
other hand, too much liquid assets yield lower income. To have more liquid assets, banks can 
review their asset portfolios as well as business lines toward investing in more short-term maturity 
asset portfolios and substituting risk-weighted assets (RWA)-free fee income for RWA-interest 
income. To sum up, higher financial cost and lower income would lead to a greater inefficiency 
for banks with too much liquidity. 
Among bank characterisktics, asset diversification and funding one are statistically significant but 
their coefficient signs are not consistent, positive for Bankscope data set while negative for the 
Call Report one. By contrast, size, non-performing loan ratio and the dummy for crisis year are 
both statistically significant and their coefficient signs are stable across the two data sets. The 
positive influence of size, non-performing loan ratio and the dummy for crisis year presents several 
important implications. First, the coefficient of size is positive, which implies that, on average, 
larger banks are more inefficient. This result is different from several previous studies (Luo et al., 
2016; Tsionas et al., 2015) who find that larger banks gain more profit efficiency. We argue that 
the positive association between bank size and profit inefficiency can be due to limited credit 
growth to enhance large banks’ liquidity position. Banks size has been considered as an important 
determinant of lending decision. Changes in credit-supply that response to liquidity requirement 
prevent large banks from earning more net interest margin and profitability. Previous studies also 
find a negative relationship between bank size and credit growth (Berger and Udell, 2006; Gavalas, 
2015). In addition, large banks tend to suffer from higher loan loss provisions during the crisis and 
lower net interest margins than small banks (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011).  Second, higher NPL 
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ratio can lead to higher profit inefficiency because banks with a higher NPL ratio have to increase 
provisions for bad loans. This finding is in line with the one in (Gaganis and Pasiouras, 2013; Luo 
et al., 2016). In the same vein, Mamatzakis (2015) suggests that the positive effect becomes 
stronger for banks with higher inefficiency scores. Finally, crisis years of 2007 and 2008 contribute 
to higher profit inefficiency.  
5.3. Robustness analysis 
In the baseline analysis, we have used NSFR as a liquidity proxy and found a U-shaped relationship 
between liquidity and profit inefficiency. In this section, we follow DeYoung and Jang (2016) in 
employing the ratio of core deposits to loans as another liquidity indicator. We choose the ratio 
because the core deposits can act as a long-term source of funding for banks. Thus, the ratio is a 
measure for the liquidity of bank balance sheets in the sense that banks with a higher ratio are 
considered to have lower liquidity risk. In addition, the ratio is similar to the computation of NSFR 
(DeYoung and Jang, 2016). 
 
 
Table 6: Impact of core deposits-to-loans ratio on bank profit inefficiency scores. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 Dependent variable: 𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑭𝑰𝑻 𝑰𝑵𝑬𝑭𝑭𝑰𝑪𝑰𝑬𝑵𝑻𝒕 
 PANEL A: Bankscope PANEL B: Call Reports 
         𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠/𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑡−1 -1.859 *** -12.255 *** -32.228 *** -2.713 *** 
 (0.484)  (1.973)  (0.873)  (0.100)  (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠/𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠)𝑡−12    3.370 ***   0.827 *** 
   (0.566)    (0.027)  𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 9.824 *** 13.771 *** -14.726 *** -0.356 *** 
 (2.836)  (2.988)  (0.958)  (0.019)  𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡−1 4.487 *** 2.862 ** -11.347 *** 0.072 *** 
 (1.312)  (1.257)  (0.340)  (0.009)  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 3.315 *** 3.136 *** 16.179 *** 0.004 * 
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 (0.351)  (0.323)  (0.214)  (0.002)  𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡−1 1.012 *** 0.975 *** 120.714 *** -0.167  
 (0.109)  (0.102)  (2.972)  (0.107)  
Crisis 5.769 *** 5.424 *** 0.295  0.082 *** 
 (0.658)  (0.607)  (0.391)  (0.007)  
Constant -43.455 *** -36.819 *** -232.501 *** 23.687 *** 
 (5.386)  (4.696)  (3.324)  (1.113)  
Banks 3765  3765  8317  8317  
Yearly observations. 30069  30069  86707  86707  
This table presents the impacts of core deposits-to-loans ratio and other bank control variables on profit 
inefficiency. Regressions 1 and 2 use data from Bankscope and regressions 3 and 4 from Call Reports (or 
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council call reports). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
 
Table 6 presents the estimation results of our robustness analysis. With regard to the linear impact 
of the ratio of core deposits to loans, the ratio has a statistically significant and negative impact on 
bank profit inefficiency in for both data sets (as shown in regressions 1 and 3). This effect implies 
that liquidity enhances profit efficiency, lending support to the argument of the public interest 
theory (Barth et al., 2006). The theory argues that stricter regulations help to align the benefits of 
bank owners, depositors and other creditors, resulting in more careful lending and better 
performance. To some extent of liquidity, the revenue of lending exceeds the cost of funding, 
leading to higher net interest margin and thus profit before tax. Regarding the nonlinear impact of 
the ratio of core deposits to loans, the quadratic term of the ratio as shown in regressions 2 and 4 
obtains positive and statistically significant coefficients. This result supports a nonlinear effect of 
the ratio on bank profit inefficiency.  
Among variables of bank characteristics, coefficients of asset and funding diversification, non-
performing loan ratio and the dummy crisis year dummy variables are either inconsistent or not 
statistically significant across four regressions in Table 6. Only coefficients of size are consistently 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that banks with larger size may promote profit 
inefficiency.   
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In this robustness analysis, we confirm that the influence of liquidity (proxied by the core deposit 
to loans ratio) on profit inefficiency is similar to that in the baseline analysis. The sign of the linear 
impact is negative for both baseline and robustness analyses and for both data sets, implying that 
banks with a higher liquidity ratio can have a lower profit inefficiency score. However, the sign of 
the quadratic term of the two liquidity indicators (NSFR and the core deposit to loans ratio) are 
positive for both analyses, indicating that banks with too much liquidity can lead to a higher profit 
inefficiency score. For bank characteristics, only size obtains a consistent sign of coefficients. Thus 
size together with liquidity are the most stable driving factors to explain profit inefficiency. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines empirically the relationship between liquidity on bank profit efficiency for 
commercial banks in the U.S over the period 2001-2015 using data from two sources: Bankscope 
and Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Call reports. Efficiency scores estimated 
using Bankscope dataset are lower than those using Call reports. More importantly, we delve more 
deeply into the non-linear relationship between bank efficiency and the NSFR under the Basel III 
framework which was designed to promote the stability of individual banks and the whole system. 
Our empirical results show that a non-linear relationship exists between NSFR and bank 
efficiency. More specifically, the results suggest that modest intensification in liquidity helps to 
improve bank profit efficiency. However, too much liquidity enlargement could ruin the profit 
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